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lN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
1

LYNN S. SCOTT and ANN B.
SCOTT, his wife, and
:B_,RANK H. BJORNDAL and
AUDREY K. BJORNDAL,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
-vsWlLFORD HANSEN and VIOLA
L. HANSEN, his wife; CECIL
HANSEN and LaDONNA HANSJ!JN,
his wife; MARJORIE BAKER;
DARRELL A. TATE; BARBARA
BUCKLEY and MICHAEL S.
TATE,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No.

10580

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CAcSE
This is a quiet title action between adjoining land
owners arising out of a conflict between Respondents'
metes and bounds description and Appellants' description according to a monument.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted judgment quieting title
in the Respondents based on a finding of payment of
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2
taxes and possession of the property in question under
a 1935 court decree awarding said property to Respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and judgment quieting title to the property in dispute in them as
a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
With one exception, the facts herein are largely
stipulated and are not in dispute. The appellants are owners of land in Salt Lake County. (R. 33). Substantially
all of this property, and all of the property in dispute,
was owned prior to December 17, 1906, by one Maggie
B. Thompson. ( R. -!-!--!5). (Ex. P-5). The Appellants'
predecessors in interest obtained their deed on December
17, 1906. (R. -!-! ) . This deed awarded certain properties
bounded on the north by the south line of a county road.
(Ex. P-2).
The Respondent's predecessors in interest acquired
their deed from l\Iaggie B. Thompson in 1913. (Ex.
P-5). The latter deed awarded certain properties
bounded on the south by the south line of the same county
road. (Ex. P-5). Hespondents' property has been
fenced for over 40 years alo·ng the north line of the
county road. (R G3). Respondents never occupied
any land south of the road. (R. 5-!).
The legal description of the boundary in controversy
as conveyed by Maggie Thompson to both Appellants'
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3
and Respondents' precedessors was substantially as
follows:
'' ... along the south side of the County Road
thence westerly along the south side of said roa:d
80 rods, more or less, to a point on the west line
of said quarter section due so.uth from the point
of beginning ... this deed is made subject to the
use of the above mentioned County Road by the
public as said road is now located." (Emphasis
supplied) (Exhibit P-5) (R. 64).

Appellants' property south of the road has been
fenced in places to prevent dumping of trash and in addition "no dumping" signs have been placed in strategic
locations on this property by Appellants. (R. -1:6).
The property south of the road has not been fanned
while the property of Respondents north of the road
has been used for fanning purposes. (R. 5-1:).
The road in question is maintained by the county.
(R. 43). lt is the only road that has ever divided
the property of the parties and has been in existence
for many years. R. 38). Certain incomplete county
surveys indicate that the road in question proceeds
in a straight line between the properties owned by the
Appellants and those owned by the Respondents. (Ex.
D-8). However, the true facts as revealed in the
trial below indicate that the road is not a straight
road but rather follows a meandering course commencing and ending at the boundary line between the properties but extending in a northerly direction into properties owned by Respondents. (Ex. 1). This road
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is a public road and is used by anyone desiring to travel
onto Danish rnad and is (•xten:,;iwly usPd by many residents of the arPa and has !wen for over 10 and probably
over 50 years. ( R ~18, 54).
In the year 1935, the estate of Respondents' predecessor in interest, Andrew Hansen, Jr., was probated
and the property decedent had acquired in 1913 was
distributed to Respondents. ( R. 59). The decree
awarding such property did not adopt the south boundary description wntained in the deed whereby Andrew
Hansen, Jr., acquired the property. Instead it purported
to distribute more property than was acquired by Andrew Hansen, Jr., by establishing a metes and bounds
description for the south boundary of the property.
(Ex. P-2). This description did not follow the south
line of the county rnad but rather cut straight across
the top of the Appellants' property, severing a substantial portion of land lying between this line and the
actual course of the road.
Tax notices containing the description set forth
in the 1906 deed have been sent to Appellants and their
predecessors. Appellants have paid taxes on the property according to this description since acquiring the
property in 1953. (Ex. P-G) (R. -1:8). In addition, Appellants acquired tax title to the property from Salt Lake
Countv by deed in 1958. (Ex. P-2).
Appellants disagree with the findings of the Lower
Court that Respondents have been in possession of the
property in controversy since 1935. The evidence re-
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garding actual possession is to the contrary. Mr. Wilford
Hansen, one of the Respondmts, testified that he had
f<mced the southern boundary of his property along the
north edge of the county road and had never attempted
to farm or otherwise use the pro1wrty south of the county
road. (R. 54).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS HA VE FEE TITLE TO AND POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY

Appellants or their predecessors hold title to the
property in controversy under a warranty deed from
one Maggie B. ·Thompson, acquired in 1906. Respondents and their predecessors also acquired title to the
property north of that obtained by Appellants from
Maggie B. Thompson in 1913. The boundary line between the properties in both cases was established by
Mrs. Thompson as the south line of the county road
then dividing the pro.perties.
This county road served as a boundary line between the properties conveyed by Mrs. Thompson until
the death of Andrew Hansen, Jr., in 1935. For all practical purposes the road has been the boundary line
ever since.
However in 1935, in a decree of distribution entered
m the probate of the Andrew Hansen, Jr., estate, the
court ordered that the south boundary of decedent's
property be fixed by a metes and bounds description.
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This description did not follow the south line of the
county road but rather followed a straight line course
across the property of Appellants' predecessors in interest creating an interlock between the boundaries
contained in the decree on the south and the north
boundary of Appellants' property as marked by the
county road. At the time of the decree no one was aware
that this interlock or overlap existed.
The effect of the 1935 decree was not to deprive
Appellants' predecessors of their previously acquired
fee title, but rather, in addition, to give Respondents
color of title to the interlocked property.
The Lower Court's decisio.n was apparently based
on the payment of taxes coupled with constructive po~
session under a claim of right or color of title by Respondents. Such a decision would have perhaps been
proper were this an ordinary adverse possessio·n case
where Respondents had actual possession of the property in question and had received such possession from
Appellants.
But in this case, certain essential elements are lacking which effectively prevent Hespondents' color of title
from being converted into title through adverse possession as against the fee title in A1Jpellants. 'l'he Lower
iCourt neglected to determine who had superior title to
the overlapping portions of the interlock.
As a general rule it is true that possession of a
part of a tract of property under color of title gives rise
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to constructive possession of the entire tract commensurate with the description in the instrument establishing color of title. See 3 Am J ur 2d, Adverse Possession, ~ 27.
ln addition 78-12-7, U.C.A., 1953, provides as
follows:
"In every action for the recovery of real
property, or the possession thereof, the person
establishing a legal title to the property shall be
presumed to be possessed thereof within the time
required by law; and the occupation of the property by any other person shall be deemed to have
been under an insubordination to the legal title,
unless it appears the property has been held and
possessed adversely to such legal title for 7 years
before the commencement of the action."
Apparently the Lower Court concluded that possession of the property was to be presumed in the Respondents because of this statute and the general rule
previously quoted.
However, where two conflicting parties both have
legal title to the property, Section 78-12-7 is not applicable. And color of title in itself is not capable of creating
implied possession without actual entry on and occupancy
of the land in question. Kentucky Coal and Timber Development Co. v. Kentucky Union Co., 214 F. 590; French
i:. Hillman, 216 F. supp 117, affirmed 331 F. 2d 305;
State v. Stockdale, 34 Wash 2d 857, 210 P 2d 686. There
can be no concurrent seisin of land under conflicting
claims of right, and the person with the best title will
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be deemed to be in pOSSl'SSion of the IJl'OlH'rlY in case of
controversy. 3 Am .Jur 2d, AdvPl'Sl' PossPssion, § 53.
\Vhere an instrument pmporting to give title cli~
regards a previously Pstablished bou11dary lim·, ('l'OSsing
over it and including other prnperties so as to creat~
an overlap, there must be actual lJOs::-;ession of the interlock or ow·rlap by the color of title claimant in order for
his possession to be deemed eo-(•:densive with his described boundary w1H·reby the interlock came into existence. See Illinois Central R. Cu. 1:. Taylor, 1G4 Ky 150,
175 SW 2G; Bmdtl ·c. Slwrl,:cy, 38 Or. 153, 113 Pac. (j53.
'l'herefore where the true O\nwr or superior dairnant of a parcel of land on which a color of title overlaps
or into which a color of title extc>nds, is in possession of
his land, and the claimant never takes possession o.f the
portion in controversy but only oecupies some other portion within his described boundaries, the possession of
the orginal owner and foe title owner remains intact
and is not displaeed by claimant's possession. The legal
title carriC's poss(~ssion of the overlapping portion with
it in such a situation. See 2 C.J S, ~\dwrse Possession,
§198; Hw1r;er 1.:. Grimm, 142 Ua., 4-18, 83 SE 200; 23
1farvard Law HPvie\\' 5(); G Col urnbia Law He view 582.
The case of Ho1rard v. Sta11olind Oil and Gas Co.,
197 Okl. 2G9, 169 P. 2d 737, is pertinent. There plaintiffs
c·lairn('(l tit!(' to entain pro1wrtit•::-; both und('r a void eontract of sale and an oral promist~ to conYey a quarter
section of land. Plaintiffs' predceessors in interest entered into possession of the land withont securing a valid
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('tJllVl')"ancl' and continu('d
time of their grantors.

Ill

po:-;:-;e:-;:-;ion during the life-

During this rwriod one of the allegl'd grantors ex(•c·ute<l fivP lllineral d(•(•cb to <ld'endanb' predecessors in
intt>rest.
The lJlaintiffs eontended that even if the mineral
ch•eds wen~ valid the title should be quil'ted in them beeause they had acquin·d it by adverse possession, having
had o-pen and notorious possession of the property for the
statutory period. 'rhe court in 4uieting title in defendants replit•d to this contention:
"Adven;e possession m order to npen into
title must be exclusive. 'Exclusive possession'
means that the disseizor must show an exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of
it to his own use and benefit. Two persons cannot
hold one iiieee of property adversely to. each
other at the same time, and where two persons
have entered upon the land, he who has the better
title will be deemed to be in possession thereof.
It is therefore essential that the possession of
one who claims adversly should establish as an
ouster of the true owner because in the absence
of ouster, the title draws to itself the continuous
possession of the property. Possession not
amounting to dissl'izin is insufficient. 1 Am
Jur 875, 87G.

"Where the possession of land is mixed, the
legal seisin is according to legal title." Deputron
v. Yoimg, 13± U.S. 241, 10 S. Ct. 539, 33 L. Ed. 923.
Because of the :rnperiority Appellants' title, there
ean he no presumption of possession in Respondents.
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And the record contains no reference whatsoever to any
actual possession of the property in controversy by Respondents. The only possible basis for a finding of possession in Respondents is the well-worn rule that actual
possession is to be constructively extended to include
possession of the entire tract for which color of title is
had. See 3 Am Jur, Adverse Possession, §27.
But this rule is not applicable to land owned by
third parties other than that held by the one having
color of title and his grantor. United Fuel Gas Co. v.
Dyer, 185 F. 2d 99 (OCA 4th, 1950).
"Thus where A enters under a deed from B describing 80 acres of land, but C owns 40 acres of B land, and
A has no actual possession of any of that part owned
by C, A's actual possession of a part of B's land will
not draw to it the constructive possession of the tract
owned by C even though it is within the limits of the
boundaries described in the deed to A." 3 Am Jur 24
Adverse Possession §29.

It has been stated that to rule otherwise would require a fee owner of land to seek out and examine the
color of title to every newcomer taking possession of
land in the vicinity, less the latter's actual possession be
constructively extended to destroy the former's title.
McCoy v. Anthony Land Co., 230 Ark, 244, 322 SW 2d 439.
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A::; Respondent::; are without either actual O·r constructive possession of the land in controversy, the judgment of the trial court cannot be upheld.
The rule that po::;::;ession of part under color of title
is vossession of whole cannot prevail where another party
in possession under a better title. Biiras v. United Gas
Pipe Line, 127 So. 2d 271. Actual possession must prevail
over any constructive pos::;ession by another even though
under color of title. Giddens v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co.,
218 Ala. 217, 118 So. 383; 2 CJS Adverne Posse::;sion,
19G (pocket parts).
POINT II
THE PARTIES HA VE ACQUIESCED AND AGREED
THAT THE COUNTY ROAD CONSTITUTES THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES.

It is clear that the predecessors in interest of both
the Appellants and Respondents consider the existing
county road to be the boundary line between their properties. The deeds which both received from Maggie B.
Thompson make it clear that this boundary was to be the
south side of the existing road.

Respondents should not now be allowed to question
this boundary line if the elements of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence are met. The case of Fuoco v.
Williams, 15 Utah 2d 153, 389 P. 2d 143, ::;eems to clearly
determine that boundary by acquiescence may be established by:
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a. Occupation up to a visible line.
b. Acquiescence in that line as a boundary.
c. For a long period of time.
d. By adjoining land owners.
The facts show herein that both parties, and their
predecessors in interest as well, have occupied up to the
county road and no more. This occupancy has been consistent since the year 1906. During this period of time, no
protest has been made that the road was not the true
boundary. Respondents have fenced their property along
the road, and the road is clearly visible and has not
changed its course or position during the period nor has
there ever been another road between the properties. In
addition, Appellants have occupied their property up
to the country road. They have placed signs thereon and
have fenced certain strategic portions of their property
to prevent its being used for dumping.
Boundary by acquiescence can be established without
an express agreement that the road is to constitute the
boundary. See Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P.
2d 410. However, in the present case an express condition
in the original deed has determined that the road would
constitute the boundary between the properties. A boun·
dary by acquiescence was clearly established and in·
tended since 1906, and the road has been treated by the
parties as the boundary ever since that time.
In the year 1935 the probate court of Salt Lake
County purported to change this boundary. Whether it
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did so intentionally or whetht-r it rnetely tried to eonform
the south boundary in several deeds to what it thought
was the legal description of the road is unknown. The
significant thing is that Appellants predecessors were
not parties to the probate proceeding. All parties to
adjoining properties are necessary parties in an action
to determine the true boundary line between properties.
Cady c. Kerr, (Wash), 118 P. 2d 182.
Any decree purporting to change an established
boundary would necessarily be void if it did not adjudicate the rights of all land owners adjacent to the boundary. It is also clear that owners of adjoining lands who
occupy their respective premises up to a certain line
which they mutually recognize as the boundary line for
a long period of time, cannot deny that the boundary so
recognized is the true line. Nelson v. DaRouch, 87 Utah
457, 50 P. 2d 273. The latter case conditions this rule
upon the boundary being open to observation and marked
by monuments. In this case, the boundary is a monument
and has been opened to observation long before 190G
when the property was first conveyed by Maggie B.
Thompson.
And even in an ordinary possession case, possession
resting upon color of title is restricted where less property is claimed than that described in the instrument
giving color of title. See Pennell v. Brookshire, 193 N.C.
73, 136 SE 257; 2 CJS, Adverse Po.ssession ~185, Page
781.
A claimant may by his own acts restrict his claims
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within narrower bounds than those delineated in his title
grant. Lyles v. Fellers, 138 S.C. 31, 136 SE 13; Sturgi 0
v. Hughes, 206 Ark. 946, 178 SW 2d 236.
Such restriction was present in the instant controversy as Respondents never attempted to take pa.ssession
of any additional property purported to have been dis.
tributed by the 1935 decree. Even if this decree doe~
give them a color of title, they will not be presumed to
possess property which they have not attempted to
possess. In this case, the Respondents' po·ssession is not
measured by the boundaries of the 1935 decree but only
by the boundaries of their claim. Respondents' claim has
never extended south of the county road.
Appellants submit that the road herein was acquiesced in as the boundary between their property and the
property of Respondents. This boundary was fixed long
before 1935 and the probate court was powerless to
change it. Appellants further submit that the road con·
tinued to be viewed as the boundary by all adjoining land
owners until shortly before the commencement of the
quiet title action herein and that the decision of the
Lower Court quieting title in Respondents is not in har·
mony with established decisions of this Court and there
fore should be overturned.
POINT III
EVEN IF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY COULD BE FOUND IN RESPONDENTS,
APPELLANTS HOLD TITLE TO SAID PROPERTY
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AND TITLE SHOULD
BE QUIETED IN THEM.
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While Re8pondent8 cannot adveri::iely claim title to
the property in question becaui::ie of their inferior title
and lack of actual po·ssession, Appellants can 8Uccessfully
acquire title by this means. Assuming, without conceding,
that the 1935 decree established a north boundary for
Appellants' property, it ii::i nonethelei::ii::i apparent that
Appellants have been in actual possession of the property
in controversy since their acqui8ition thereof in 1955.
They arc in possession both under a deed granting them
the property to the south of the county road as well as
under a tax title ai::i8essing the property up to this i::iame
monument line.
Section

78-1~-7.l

provides in part:

" . . . [I]f If in any action any party shall
establish prima-facie evidence that he is the owner
of any real property under a tax title held by him
and his predecessors for four years prior to the
commencement of such action and one year after
the effective date of this amendment, he shall be
presumed to be the owner of such property by
adverse possession unless it appears that the
owner of the legal title or his predecessor has
actually occupied or been in possession of such
property under such title or that such tax title
owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all
of the taxes levied or assessed upon such property
within such four-year period."
Appellants have paid all of the taxes levied upon the
property in question and are the owners of the property
nnder a bona fide tax deed and have been for a period
of over 8 years. All taxes on the property during this time
have been paid. Tax notices in the name o·f Appellants
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describing the property in question have been mailed (1,
Appellants and have been paid by them. These notic1.,
describe the property in question as bordering along tht
south side of the county road as far as the north boun
dary is concerned.
Section 78-12-5.2 provides in part:
"No action or defense for the recover or possession of real property or to quiet title or to determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax
title after the expiration of four years from the
date of the sale, conveyance, or transfer of such
tax title to any county or directly to any other
purchase (sic) thereof at any public or privatt
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from
the date of this act."
Where, as in the present case, the Appellants have
been in actual possession of the property in controversy
and have paid the taxes thereon and hold title thereto
under a tax title in addition to their warranty deed, it
appears that the statutory requirements of adverse possession of tax titles have been met and that the title to
the property should be quieted in Appellants as a matter
of law.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Lower Court is not supported
by the facts and is not in harmony with well established
decisions of this Court. The Appellants are the owners
in fee of the property in question and have superior title
thereto as contrasted to Respondents color of title creat-
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ing an overlap along the north-:south boundary of the
property in question. The overlap created by the decree
of the probate court in 1935 cannot control the rights
of tlrn property a:s far a:;, Appellant:;,' predecessors in
interest are concerned, and title to the property should
be quieted in Appellants. The judgment of the Lo.wer
Court should be overruled.
Respectfully submitted.
KIRTON & BETTILYON
F. Burton Howard
Attorney for Appellants
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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